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I. INTRODUCTION

―I wouldn‘t wish what I am going through on anyone,‖ Senator Ted
Stevens commented after losing his seat in the United States Senate on
November 18, 2008.1 Senator Stevens lost the race largely because a
criminal conviction damaged his reputation.2 After Senator Stevens
endured months of contentious litigation, the jury convicted the longest
serving Republican senator in United States history on seven felony counts
of ethics violations.3 Six months later, the presiding judge, the Honorable
Emmet Sullivan, vacated the conviction at the request of Attorney General
Eric Holder because of blatant failures to disclose exculpatory evidence.4
Senator Stevens5 brings a high-profile example to the continuing
discussion of the problems inherent in the criminal disclosure rules. His
case exemplifies how the current structure of the material disclosure
standard often results in the suppression of material evidence.
A criminal prosecutor possesses considerable authority over the
evolution of a criminal proceeding.6 As a result, one of a prosecutor‘s
primary responsibilities is to ensure that trials are fair.7 The Constitution,8
the opinions of the Supreme Court,9 the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,10 and the American Bar Association‘s Standards for Criminal
1. Carl Hulse, Democrats Gain as Stevens Loses His Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2008, at A1.
2. See id.
3. Id.; Neil A. Lewis, Senator is Guilty over His Failures to Disclose Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2008, at A1.
4. Adam Clymer, Ted Stevens, 86, Helped Shape Alaska in 40 Years in Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2010, at A12; Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilber, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case
Against Ex-Senator; Justice Dept. Cites Prosecutors’ Behavior During Stevens Trial, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2009, at A1.
5. Regardless of the public disapproval Senator Stevens has received from his ―bridge-tonowhere,‖ Senator Stevens is a sympathetic character in this instance because the justice system
failed him. If the justice system can fail a sitting United States senator, it can certainly fail the rest
of the American population as well. Later, before his case could have been tried again, Senator
Stevens died in a plane crash on August 9, 2010. William Yardley & Liz Robbins, Ex-Senator
From Alaska Is Killed in Air Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A10.
6. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (―[T]he prosecution, which alone can
know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure . . . .‖).
7. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (―Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly.‖).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (―We now
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.‖).
9. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009) (―The prosecutor in a criminal case
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Justice11 establish this obligation. Accordingly, a criminal prosecutor must
not only convict the guilty but must also ensure that the innocent are not
convicted.12 Pursuant to that responsibility, a prosecutor must disclose
material evidence to the defense.13
Beginning in Brady v. Maryland,14 and continuing to Strickler v.
Greene,15 the Supreme Court‘s line of cases established the framework
underlying a criminal prosecutor‘s duty to disclose.16 The Supreme Court
has held that the material evidence standard17 consists of three
components: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must
be willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) ―prejudice
must have ensued.‖18
While the Supreme Court‘s precedent establishes a clear standard, its
subsequent interpretation and application have created an array of
complexity.19 Too often, prosecutors have interpreted their disclosure
obligations inconsistently.20 The current standard requires a sensitive caseshall . . . make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .‖).
11. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (―A prosecutor should not intentionally
fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of
all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense
charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.‖).
12. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (―[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.‖).
13. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–84 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976);
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
14. Brady, 373 U.S. 83.
15. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263.
16. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–84; Agurs,
427 U.S. at 110–11; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
17. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
18. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.
19. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 477, 487–89
(2001). Professor Kevin McMunigal notes that the Supreme Court‘s cases dealing with
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence create a lot of ―confusion‖ and ―practical
application problems remain.‖ Id. McMunigal primarily attributes this confusion to the lingering
ambiguity of the rule‘s scope. Id. at 488; see also Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette:
Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 35 (2004) (―While the United States Supreme Court‘s central
holding in Brady was favorable to defendants, subsequent cases demonstrated that the contours of
Brady were not clear.‖).
20. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposal: Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 94
(2004). (―With neither a clear definition of favorable evidence nor a disclosure timetable,
prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional discovery obligation inconsistently . . . .‖). The
article goes on to state:
Federal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word ―exculpatory,‖ have
interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways. A number of
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by-case analysis to determine whether disclosure is required.21 These caseby-case determinations of the evidence‘s materiality have failed to produce
clear guidelines for when prosecutors need to disclose exculpatory
evidence.22 More problematic, these varying prosecutorial interpretations
have undermined Brady‘s constitutional significance.23 The lack of clarity
inherent in the standard exposes the prosecutor to cognitive biases when he
attempts to determine which evidence to disclose and which to conceal.24
With the advent of modern technology, post-conviction DNA evidence
sheds some empirical light on how prosecutorial suppression of material
evidence undermines Brady‘s constitutional significance and constitutes a
major cause of wrongful convictions.25 Post-conviction DNA evidence has
exonerated more than two hundred criminal defendants, and according to
some research, almost half of those cases involved prosecutorial
misconduct.26 Nearly a half century after Brady, prosecutors still fail to
disclose material evidence.27 Some research even suggests that 16%–19%
of reversals in capital cases are attributable to the non-disclosure of
exculpatory evidence.28 These numbers are quite difficult to swallow while
holding a confident belief that the criminal justice system convicts the
guilty but spares the innocent. Could it be true that one out of every five
prosecutors have interpreted Brady narrowly and believe that a prosecutor‘s
Brady obligation is limited solely to turning over information that someone
other than the defendant has confessed to the crime at issue. Many prosecutors
do not focus on the critical language of the Brady decision, which requires
disclosure of evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce one‘s penalty. Others,
knowing of favorable evidence, have tried to predict its effect on the outcome
of the case in deciding whether to disclose. Still others do not view Giglio or
impeachment material as part of the Brady exculpatory disclosure obligation.
And yet others have separated the timing of the disclosure of exculpatory or
guilt-related evidence from the disclosure of mitigating or punishment-related
evidence.
Id. at 103–04.
21. McMunigal, supra note 19, at 485. The Supreme Court‘s standard from ―the line of cases
from Brady v. Maryland through Strickler v. Greene on prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory
evidence‖ is the ―product of a gradual, case-by-case process of accretion.‖ Id.
22. Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 509 (2009)
(―[C]ase-by-case determinations of the materiality of undisclosed evidence have failed to produce
clear guidelines for prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence.‖).
23. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 95. After its review of the issue, the
subcommittee of the Federal Criminal Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial
Lawyers report stated, ―[t]his Committee believes that the constitutional mandate of Brady has been
undermined by varying prosecutorial interpretations . . . .‖ Id.
24. See Burke, supra note 22, at 483 (―[T]he current constitutional standard amplifies
cognitive biases that will distort even an ethical prosecutor‘s application of Brady and
systematically lead to under-disclosure of exculpatory evidence.‖).
25. Id. at 509–10.
26. Id. at 510 & n.179.
27. Id. at 509 (―Forty-five years have passed since the Court announced its decision in Brady,
and yet the widespread failure of prosecutors to disclose Brady material is well known.‖).
28. Id. at 510 n.180.
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prosecutors in capital cases that are reversed results from prosecutors
intentionally concealing evidence? The issue, however, is not limited to a
prosecutor‘s intent to conceal evidence. Rather, what these statistics point
out is that our system is flawed because of the lack of clearly defined rules
that fail to counteract the cognitive biases inherent in the disclosure
decisionmaking process.
As these startling statistics demonstrate, the current material evidence
standard fails to provide defendants sufficient access to exonerable
evidence.29 As Professor Alafair S. Burke explains, ―the Court‘s standard
of materiality invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue it. Because
of cognitive biases, prosecutors will overestimate the strength of their case
in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the potentially
exculpatory value of the evidence, and therefore fail to recognize
materiality even when it exists.‖30 The innocent, not the guilty, bear the
cost of that failure.31 This Note addresses the complexities in the current
standard that leave prosecutors vulnerable to cognitive bias. Part II
provides an overview of the criminal prosecutor‘s obligation to disclose
material evidence. Part III examines how, under the present standard,
cognitive bias affects the prosecutor‘s decisionmaking process, causing
even prosecutors acting in good faith to under-disclose.32 Part IV
demonstrates how objective guidelines could ameliorate cognitive bias in
decisionmaking.33 This Note argues for the implementation of bright-line
rules to guide prosecutorial discretion. It urges a solution that identifies the
salient facts from the case law and enumerates those facts into a codified
Strickler three-prong standard.34 A bright-line standard should exist
requiring disclosure when any of the following scenarios are present:35
(1)
Prior perjury or false testimony of a government witness;
(2)
Promises of immunity to a government witness;
(3)
Monetary rewards to key government witnesses;
(4)
Mental impairments of a government witness;
(5)
Information reflecting bias or prejudice of a government
witness against defendant;
(6)
Confessions to the crime by others; and
(7)
Inconsistent or contradictory scientific tests.36
Such bright-line disclosure rules will confine a prosecutor‘s discretion
within substantive, clear lines by enumerating uniform and demonstrable
29. Id. (―The Brady doctrine has failed to accomplish its objective of providing defendants
access to material exculpatory evidence . . . .‖).
30. Id. at 499.
31. Id. at 510–11 (―[T]he costs of that failure are borne not by the guilty, but by the
innocent.‖).
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part IV.A.
36. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103.
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standards that would require disclosure.37 Doing so will reduce the
opportunity for cognitive bias to creep into a prosecutor‘s decisionmaking
process.38 By counteracting the cognitive bias inherent in the present
standard, a codified solution would prevent unintentional under-disclosure
and, ultimately, ensure a defendant‘s constitutional rights are better
preserved.39
II. PROSECUTOR‘S DUTY TO DISCLOSE: THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE
STANDARD
A. Special Role of the Prosecutor to Ensure a Fair Trial
The prosecutor‘s first and foremost responsibility is to administer
justice.40 The prosecutor is placed in a unique position in regard to the
adjudication process.41 He possesses substantial authority over all aspects
of a criminal proceeding, especially with regard to evidence.42 As a result,
he has the dual responsibility to ensure that the guilty shall not escape and
the innocent shall not suffer.43 A criminal prosecutor is called to
heightened responsibilities because ―[he] is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.‖44
Thus, a prosecutor‘s role in a criminal prosecution is not to win a case, but
rather, to ensure justice shall be done.45
In regards to disclosing material evidence, the Supreme Court has
consistently stressed that the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to ensure
the accused receives a fair trial.46 Because of his control over evidence,
37. See infra Part IV.A.
38. Burke, supra note 22, at 509.
39. See id. at 509–11.
40. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
41. Id.
42. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
43. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (―A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.‖); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 11, § 3-1.2(c) (―The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.‖).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976)
(―[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that
elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request. For though the
attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be
faithful to his client‘s overriding interest that ‗justice shall be done.‘ He is the ‗servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.‘ This description of the
prosecutor‘s duty illuminates the standard of materiality that governs his obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence.‖ (internal citation omitted)); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963)
(―We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.‖).
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only the prosecutor can know what evidence is undisclosed.47 As a result,
he has the sole responsibility to determine when disclosure is needed.48 ―It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one.‖49
B. The Duty to Disclose: The Material Evidence Standard and Its
Evolution
The Supreme Court first articulated a prosecutor‘s constitutional duty to
disclose material evidence in Brady v. Maryland.50 The Court set forth a
standard that required a prosecutor to turn over ―evidence favorable to an
accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment.‖51 The Court held that suppression of material evidence
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52
Since Brady, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the prosecutor‘s
obligation to disclose material evidence.53 In its most recent case,
Strickler,54 the Court extracted the most relevant concepts from its five
previous cases55 and provided a concise summary of what each contributed
to the material evidence standard:
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution. . . . [T]he duty to disclose such evidence is
applicable even though there has been no request by the
accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Such evidence is
material ―if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
47. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Although there may be instances where the
police may not pass along all the evidence to the prosecutor, in most instances, a prosecutor
receives all the evidence the police uncover. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, it will focus
on the practical realities rather than the exception where the police hide unfavorable evidence from
prosecutors.
48. Id.
49. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
51. Id. In Brady, the prosecution turned over witness statements at the defense‘s request but
withheld particular testimony of a companion who confessed to the actual killing. Only after the
accused was tried, convicted, and sentenced was the confession discovered. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 87.
53. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–84 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
110–11 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972).
54. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263.
55. Id. at 280–81; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110–
11; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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proceeding would have been different.‖ Moreover, the rule
encompasses evidence ―known only to police investigators
and not to the prosecutor.‖ In order to comply with Brady,
therefore, ―the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in this case, including the police.‖56
After retracing the evolution of the material evidence standard, the
Strickler Court articulated a three-prong standard.57 To qualify as material
evidence: (1) ―[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching‖; (2) the
evidence must have been willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state;
and (3) ―prejudice must have ensued.‖58
The Court, however, did not stop there. For the first time in thirty-five
years, the Court added a bright-line rule to the standard.59 The Court
determined that if a witness‘s trial testimony differs from his initial
perceptions recorded in undisclosed documents, it would establish the
material character of the documents.60 Strickler represented a substantial
step forward because it enumerated a clear guideline that brought greater
substance to the Court‘s standard.61 Although this is a step in the right
direction, prosecutors still need additional bright-line rules to provide
guidance for discharging their Brady obligations.
C. FRCRP: Discovery Rule 16 Omits the Material Evidence
Standard
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs discovery
in federal criminal cases.62 In general, Rule 16 only requires prosecutors to
disclose certain limited information at a defendant‘s request: oral
statements made by the defendant,63 summaries of expert testimony,64
copies of documents the government intends to use at trial,65 and reports of
scientific tests and medical examinations.66 Although these minimal
enumerated items represent a gradual expansion of the disclosure
obligation, significant flaws still exist in the rule.67 First, this list of
56. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280–81 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 and citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107).
57. Id. at 281–82.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 295–96.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (2009).
63. Id. at 16(a)(1)(A).
64. Id. at 16(a)(1)(G).
65. Id. at 16(a)(1)(E).
66. Id. at 16(a)(1)(F).
67. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 102 (―Although Rule 16 has gradually
expanded the scope of discovery required in criminal cases, it still does not require the government
to timely disclose to the defendant favorable information that is material either to guilt or
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discovery items is rather limited68 and fails to adequately address the
considerable gaps in the standard.69 Secondly, Rule 16 completely omits
the Brady material evidence standard.70 Even though the defense may try to
file a Brady motion to permit additional discovery beyond Rule 16, the
elusive scope of the standard often fails to unearth evidence critical to the
defense.71
Despite Rule 16‘s limited contribution to the standard, the Criminal
Rules Advisory Committee has repeatedly considered whether to include a
Brady amendment into the Federal Rules.72 Since the Supreme Court
decided Brady in 1963, the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee has
addressed changes to Rule 16 over forty separate times.73 Twenty-two of
those occasions dealt directly with a Brady amendment.74 Of the Brady
proposals, five occurred within the first five years of the Court‘s Brady
opinion.75 The remaining seventeen occurred in the last six years to date.76
1. The Recent History: 2004–2010
After an affirmative decision to keep a Brady amendment out of Rule
16 in 1968, the Advisory Committee revisited the proposal for the first
time in 2004.77 This resulted in the establishment of a subcommittee
sentencing. This limited disclosure makes the defense of a federal criminal case especially difficult,
considering the government‘s ability to control the flow of information to the defendant . . . and the
inability of the defense to compel disclosure.‖).
68. Id. at 101 (―Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide for wide-ranging
discovery and disclosure in the form of depositions, disclosure statements, requests for production,
inspections and requests for admissions, interrogatories and expert reports, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure afford the defendant extremely limited access to government information.‖).
69. See id. at 104 (―[The rule‘s] disclosure obligations neither define the nature and/or scope
of favorable information, nor require consultation with law enforcement officers, nor do they
provide clear pre-trial or pre-plea deadlines for disclosure.‖).
70. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (2009).
71. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 102–03. (―In addition to disclosure under
Rule 16, criminal defense lawyers can try to obtain Brady and Giglio material by filing a motion
with the court. . . . Brady-Giglio motions, however, often fail to unearth evidence that is critical to
the defense [because] [f]ederal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word ‗exculpatory,‘ have
interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways.‖).
72. See Subcomm. on Rule 16 to the Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules, Comm. on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 111th Cong., Criminal
Rules Committee Considered Proposed Amendment to Rule 16, Table of Contents (Comm. Print
2009) [History of Rule 16 Amendments], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndP
olicies/rules/Rule%2016%20Table%20of%20Contents.pdf (summarizing previous committee
meetings).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see infra notes 99 and 101 and accompanying text.
75. History of Rule 16 Amendments, supra note 72.
76. Id.
77. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 8
(Oct. 24–25, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule
%2016%20Part%201.pdf.
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dedicated to the efforts associated with a Brady amendment.78 ―At the
subcommittee‘s request, the Federal Judicial Center compiled a survey of
local rules, administrative orders, and relevant case law . . . .‖79 In April of
2005, the subcommittee used the information from the study to present a
preliminary draft of a Brady amendment to the Advisory Committee.80 The
Advisory Committee subsequently voted 8-to-3 to endorse the amendment
in principle but asked the subcommittee to continue its drafting efforts.81
In April 2006, the Advisory Committee temporarily suspended its
consideration of an amendment.82 The Advisory Committee wanted to give
the drafters of the United States Attorneys‘ Manual (USAM) an
opportunity to make the proposed change that would address a prosecutor‘s
obligation to disclose material evidence.83 At its next meeting in
September of 2006, frustrated with the slow progress of the USAM
amendment, the Advisory Committee resumed its consideration even
though the USAM process had not yet finished.84 The Advisory Committee
approved a proposed amendment to Rule 16 codifying Brady and sent the
proposal to the Standing Committee on Federal Rules of Practice and
Procedure, recommending that it be published for public comment.85A
month later, the Attorney General approved the USAM amendment, and
although the Standing Committee recognized the positive benefits of a
national uniform rule, it did not publish the amendment for public
comment because it wanted to give the USAM changes enough time to
have a measureable effect.86 The Standing Committee recommended that
the Advisory Committee reexamine the language of the proposed
amendment to ensure that it did not create too great a burden on the
government.87 It also recommended that the Advisory Committee review
the experiences of the courts with local rules on the same subject.88
In April of 2007, the Advisory Committee requested an updated study
of local rules, administrative orders, and case law from the Federal Judicial
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 10
(Oct. 26–27, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule
%2016%20Part%201.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 1–
7 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20
16%20Part%201.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Id.; Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 9–10
(Mar. 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20
16%20Part%201.pdf.
87. Judicial Conf. Comm on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 29 (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20P
art%201.pdf. .
88. Id.
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Center.89 After a brief two-month study, the Advisory Committee
presented the research and a proposed amendment to the Standing
Committee at its June 2007 meeting.90 The Standing Committee opposed
immediate publication but did not reject the amendment entirely.91 It
concluded, however, that further study should be methodically pursued.92 It
recommended that the Advisory Committee research the impact of USAM
changes and investigate the experience of courts governed by local orders
similar to the proposed Brady amendment.93
After eighteen months of little discussion, the most recent push for a
Brady amendment came from the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan in April
2009.94 Judge Sullivan witnessed significant Department of Justice (DOJ)
abuses of the Brady standard while presiding over United States v.
Stevens.95 In October 2009,96 the Advisory Committee considered a request
from Judge Sullivan to amend Federal Rule 16.97 The matter was referred
to the newly reconstituted subcommittee on Rule 16 for further study, and
a report was delivered to the Advisory Committee in April 2010.98 At the
Advisory Committee‘s meeting on April 15–16, 2010, the Committee
deferred action on enacting a Brady amendment for a later date.99
89. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 3
(Apr. 16–17, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%
2016%20Part%201.pdf; see also LAURAL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V.
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES:
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2007).
90. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 3
(Apr. 16–17, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%
2016%20Part%201.pdf; Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting
Minutes 31–39 (June 11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPo
licies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf.
91. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 39 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20
Part%201.pdf
92. Id.
93. Judicial Conf. Comm on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 29 (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20
Part%201.pdf.
94. Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, D.C., to Richard C. Tallman, Chairman,
Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CR%20Suggestions%202
009/09-CR-A-Suggestion-Sullivan.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Letter from Richard C. Tallman, Chairman Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, D.C. (June 2, 2009),
available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2009/07/tallman-ltr-to-sullivan.pdf.
97. Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan to Richard C. Tallman, supra note 94.
98. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, CRIMINAL RULES DOCKET 12, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010-CRDocket.pdf.
99. Id.; see also Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7–8
(Apr. 15–16, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Min
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Currently, history is repeating itself as the most recent push for a Brady
amendment to the Federal Criminal Rules has stalled again.
One thing is clear from the present history: contentious and
consequential issues still exist in regard to a Brady amendment.100 As for
the DOJ‘s position, its new 2010 policy, enacted on January 4, 2010,
adopts a ―multi-faceted approach‖ to the issue, again illustrating both the
DOJ‘s strong opposition to a codified rule and its long held belief that
internal guidance will work properly to protect defendants from
prosecutorial abuse or bias.101 Others in opposition believe there is
insufficient statistical evidence to require an external and independently
enforced amendment to the Rule.102 Supporters of the amendment,
however, respond that empirical data is difficult to collect.103 Many times,
the defense will never discover that material evidence has been withheld.104
In addition, they argue that an amendment would help ensure consistent
application of the disclosure obligation.105 Of primary importance, an
amendment must provide clear guidance as to prosecutors‘ discretion.106
utes/CR2010-04-min.pdf.
100. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 5 (Oct. 1–2, 2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.
pdf.
101. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., to David F. Levi, Judge, U.S. E.
Dist. Court of Calif. 5 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf; see Memorandum from David G. Odgen, Deputy
Attorney Gen., to U.S. Dep‘t of Justice Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html. The DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖
emphasizes ―training, guidance, strong leadership, and more uniformity.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory
Comm on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf. The Department‘s approach
includes a requirement that all federal prosecutors undergo discovery training, a requirement that
each U.S. Attorney‘s Office designate an expert on discovery to advise prosecutors on individual
cases, and the creation of a new position will be to oversee all of these changes. Id. The DOJ has
also talked about creating an on-line database of material on Brady issues and is considering
developing a manual to exclusively outline disclosure obligations. Id.
Although the DOJ‘s opposition to a codified rule can be inferred from its new 2010 policy, the
Department has explicitly objected to a codified rule for years. See, e.g., id. at 6; History of Rule 16
Amendments, supra note 72, at 2–3.
102. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 7 (Oct. 30,
2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20
Part%201.pdf.
103. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 37 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%
20Part%201.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., to David F. Levi, Judge, U.S. E.
Dist. Court of Calif. 11 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf.
106. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 35 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20
Part%201.pdf
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Not only would courts be more likely to enforce an objectively enumerated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, supporters argue, but without a new
codified rule, prosecutors may treat their current case law-based disclosure
obligations as of secondary importance to the explicit discovery obligations
found in Rule 16.107
Spurred by the Advisory Committee reconvening to debate the issue
once again,108 this Note attempts to explain the inherent structural
problems of the current standard, suggest the principal ways codification
would address some of the structural issues, and offer some effective
solutions as to how that codification could take place.
III. UNCLEAR LINES: A STANDARD WITHOUT RULES
At the heart of the current problem, Rule 16 and the Supreme Court fail
to provide guidance to prosecutors for applying the Brady standard.109
Individual prosecutors are left to their own judgment to fill in the gaps of
the standard by determining what constitutes ―material evidence.‖110
Without clear guidelines, prosecutors determine materiality issues by
relying heavily on a case-specific analysis.111 An exclusive case-specific
analysis,112 what Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski terms ―an insider
perspective,‖113 leaves prosecutors more susceptible to the cognitive biases
107. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 104 (―In the absence of a procedural rule
containing a clear definition of Brady material, requiring prosecutors to consult with law
enforcement officers, and mandating a firm compliance timetable, the duty to disclose favorable
information has become blurred and, at best, of secondary importance to the explicit discovery
obligations and procedures found in Rule 16.‖).
108. Justice Department Opposes Expanded Brady Rule, MAIN JUSTICE, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/15/justice-department-opposes-expanded-brady-rule/ (―The
advisory committee meets again in April and could vote to open Sullivan‘s proposal to six-month
public comment period. The standing committee meets in January, at which time the department is
expected to provide a fuller picture of its efforts.‖).
109. Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 619, 635 (2007) (―The lack of written policies for exercising discretion and the lack of
transparency in the process are breeding grounds for inconsistency and potential arbitrariness in the
way prosecutors in an office approach their work.‖).
110. Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 562–63 (―Irrespective of all these rules [Rule 16
and the Constitution], gaps exist with respect to the prosecutor‘s duty to provide
discovery. . . . [P]rosecutors fill in the gap by considering broader concerns for a fair and
expeditious process.‖).
111. Joy, supra note 109, at 636 (―Without written policies, the prosecutors making these
decisions are left to determine, on their own, the proper way of handling a situation . . . .‖).
112. ―Exclusive case-specific analysis‖ in this context is an approach to determining
materiality issues by focusing on the relative comparison of in-case facts to one another while
giving little attention to the comparison of facts across cases. A prosecutor that uses case-specific
analysis will evaluate evidence within the context of the other facts in the case. This approach is
highly associated with determining prejudice in material evidence cases. In contrast, an ―across-case
comparison‖ is an approach to determining materiality issues by focusing on the comparative
similarities among facts from other cases. See generally infra note 111.
113. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79
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that affect disclosure decisions.114
A. Cognitive Bias Results in Under-Disclosure
Cognitive bias inherent in the human thought process presents a
dangerous impediment to a defendant‘s access to material evidence.115
Problematically, the current material evidence standard fails to counteract
the known presence of cognitive bias inherent in its current structure.116 As
a result, the criminal justice system risks the wrongful conviction of
innocent defendants.117
Studies in human nature reveal that the cognitive biases in the
decisionmaking process not only make it difficult to identify materiality
issues, but once material issues are identified, cognitive bias leads to
unintentional undervaluing of the evidence.118 Confirmation bias,119
selective information processing,120 and resistance to cognitive
dissonance121 are all forms of cognitive bias that are amplified by the
current standard. The present standard, as it stands, unnecessarily subjects
innocent defendants to a process that provides no correction for these
known cognitive biases.122
OR. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (2000).
114. Id. ―This insider perspective makes it difficult to identify cognitive illusions that might
affect judgment.‖ Id. Psychologists recognize a distinction between insider perspectives and
outsider perspectives in that cognitive bias has less of an impact on outsider perspectives: ―[P]eople
can more easily identify cognitive biases when they treat a decision-making problem as one of a
class of similar problems that many other people face than when they treat it as a unique problem
that they face alone.‖ Id. at 65.
115. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494 (―[The] materiality standard amounts not simply to a
challenging doctrine, under which prosecutors are just as likely to misapply the standard in one
direction as the other. Instead, the doctrine acts upon cognitive biases from which prosecutors, like
all human decision makers, suffer. . . . [I]n applying Bagley‘s materiality standard, [prosecutors]
will do so by systematically underestimating, not overestimating, materiality.‖).
116. Id. at 499 (―[T]he Court‘s standard of materiality invites prosecutors to systematically
undervalue it. Because of cognitive biases, prosecutors will overestimate the strength of their case
in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the potentially exculpatory value of the
evidence, and therefore fail to recognize materiality even when it exists.‖).
117. Id. at 510–11 (―The Brady doctrine has failed to accomplish its objective of providing
defendants access to material exculpatory evidence, and the costs of that failure are borne . . . by the
innocent.‖).
118. Id. at 499.
119. Burke, supra note 22, at 495. For a detailed analysison the effects of confirmation bias,
see Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 129, 142–43 & n.96 (2011).
120. Burke, supra note 22, at 495 (―Selective information processing is the tendency for
people to accept at face value information that is consistent with their existing beliefs, while
devaluing inconsistent information.‖).
121. Id. at 495–96.
122. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 322 (―But the innateness of these cognitive
biases . . . demands that we become aware of [the] cognitive processes and the tunnel vision they
produce, and that we search for ways to neutralize them. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system
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1. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias affects a prosecutor‘s collection of evidence.123
Confirmation biases are errors in information processing that lead humans
to collect evidence in a manner that tends to confirm their hypotheses,
independently of whether they are true or not.124 Confirmation bias
research reveals that human reasoning unintentionally favors evidence that
confirms one‘s working hypothesis.125 Thus, in the course of acquiring
knowledge, humans subconsciously seek information in a way that leads
them to collect data that reflect one‘s viewpoint.126 Professor Alafair S.
Burke explains the impact of confirmation bias on a prosecutor:
When a prosecutor initially reviews a case file, she does so
to test the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty. Because
of confirmation bias, she is likely to search the
investigative file for evidence that confirms the defendant‘s
guilt to the detriment of any exculpatory evidence that
might disprove the working hypothesis. She may, for
example, take note of the defendant‘s confession without
questioning the circumstances under which it was elicited
or a lack of self-verifying detail within the confession. She
might search for a positive identification by an eyewitness
without scrutinizing the reliability of the procedure used to
obtain the identification.127
While simple awareness of cognitive bias may ease its effect, it is
impossible to wholly eliminate cognitive bias from the decisionmaking
process.128

fails to do that. Rather, both institutional pressures inherent in the adversary system and explicit
policy choices reinforce and exacerbate [their] natural tendencies . . . .‖).
123. Barbara O‘Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y. & L. 315, 316–
18 (2009).
124. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects,
in STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE: ESSENTIAL READINGS 212, 212 (Charles Stangor ed., 2000); Burke,
supra note 22, at 495.
125. Burke, supra note 22, at 495.
126. Id. (―For example, researchers have found that subjects asked to determine whether a
person is an extrovert ask questions such as, ‗What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at
a party?‘ Any answer to this question could only support, and never disprove, the theory that the
person being questioned was an extrovert.‖).
127. Id.
128. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 371 (―The challenge is [that] the cognitive biases that
contribute to the problem are not easily suppressed by self-awareness, training, or practice.
Unfortunately, research suggests that merely informing people about a cognitive bias, or urging a
person to overcome the bias, is to some degree ineffective.‖); Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 99
(―The bias cannot be eliminated by warning people about the influence of the bias.‖).
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2. Selective Information Processing
―Once the prosecutor has conducted a search of the file and determined
that the defendant is guilty, he becomes subject to selective information
processing. Selective information processing is the tendency of people to
accept at face value information that is consistent with their existing
beliefs, while devaluing inconsistent information.‖129 As Burke describes,
if a prosecutor believes that a defendant is guilty, she will unintentionally
―give more weight to evidence that buttresses her existing beliefs than to
contradictory evidence.‖130 Selective information processing reinforces
existing beliefs by the subconscious selective favoring of information
consistent with those beliefs.131 ―In other words, [a prosecutor] will accept
at face value any new inculpatory evidence, [such as] the testimony of an
additional witness against the defendant, but she is likely to cast aside
potentially exculpatory evidence as unreliable or irrelevant, such as
evidence suggesting that the witness may be biased.‖132
3. Cognitive Dissonance
―A prosecutor‘s evaluation of [material evidence] may also be skewed
by a resistance to cognitive dissonance.‖133 The cognitive dissonance
literature demonstrates that people have an instinctive drive to reduce
dissonance by seeking ways to justify or rationalize their beliefs in light of
contrary evidence.134 Burke suggests:
[H]ow this phenomenon might apply to a prosecutor who
[brought] charges against a defendant only to be confronted
later with evidence suggesting the defendant‘s innocence.
To avoid the cognitive dissonance . . . [a] prosecutor is
likely to discount the exculpatory value of the new evidence
and overestimate the strength of her original case against
the defendant.135
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that humans will rationalize and
justify existing beliefs even in light of explicit evidence to the contrary.136
As this research suggests, a completely objective analysis is virtually
impossible due to cognitive human behavior.137 Cognitive bias
129. Burke, supra note 22, at 495.
130. Id.
131. Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Informal Logical Fallacies, in CRITICAL THINKING IN
PSYCHOLOGY 110, 121 (Robert J. Sternberg, Henry L. Roediger III & Diane F. Halpern eds., 2007).
132. Burke, supra note 22, at 495.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 495–96.
135. Id. at 496.
136. Id. at 495–96.
137. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 307–08. In referring to the product of these cognitive
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substantially impacts prosecutorial discretion.138 Not only does cognitive
bias affect how prosecutors gather information, but it also affects what
weight they give to the information they collect, and subsequently, how
they instinctively rationalize and justify their existing beliefs even in light
of explicit contrary evidence.139 Ultimately, because our present material
standard fails to recognize or counteract these cognitive biases, the current
structure invites cognitive error.140 Because of cognitive biases, when
prosecutors err in applying the standard, they tend to underestimate, not
overestimate, materiality.141
B. Uncovering Under-Disclosure: The Sources of Cognitive Bias
As noted, the structure of the current system leaves wide discretion in
the hands of the prosecutor.142 In applying a standard, broad discretion
when combined with a lack of guidance results in a lack of uniformity.143
In the absence of uniform disclosure rules across circuits, prosecutors are
essentially the ones who make the discretionary case-by-case determination
of whether evidence is material.144 Therefore, the prosecutors, rather than
biases as ―tunnel vision,‖ Professors Keith Findley and Michael Scott note: ―The tendency toward
tunnel vision is . . . innate; it is part of our psychological makeup. . . . [It] is so ubiquitous, even
among well meaning actors in the criminal justice system.‖ Id. The undeniable presence of these
cognitive biases is so pervasive that Findley and Scott term the phenomena ―[t]he inevitability of
tunnel vision.‖ Id. at 396.
138. See id. at 307–08, 395–97; Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 102. For empirical data on the
subject, see O‘Brien, supra note 123, at 318–31.
139. Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96. For further discussion of how a prosecutor‘s office
environment magnifies the effect of cognitive bias on individuals, see Andrew E. Taslitz,
Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 271, 310 (2006) (arguing that ―group dynamics‖ of a prosecutor‘s office
exacerbate individual cognitive bias).
140. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96; Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 395–97;
Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 102; see also O‘Brien, supra note 123, at 316–18.
141. Burke, supra note 22, at 499 (―The Brady doctrine has failed to live up to its vision of
providing defendants access to exculpatory evidence. . . . [T]he Court‘s standard of materiality
invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue it. Because of cognitive biases, prosecutors will
overestimate the strength of their case in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the
potentially exculpatory value of the evidence, and therefore fail to recognize materiality even when
it exists.‖).
142. See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis —Reminders to
Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 87 (2008) ( ―Federal prosecutors
wield broad discretion with little guidance . . . .‖).
143. Joy, supra note 109, at 630 (―Under Brady . . . the prosecutor has the discretion to
determine what constitutes exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it. This has led to
inconsistent decisions with some prosecutors turning over to defendants material other prosecutors
fail to disclose . . . .‖). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of
Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1517 (2000) (―In not providing
guidance that is specific to a case . . . consistency in the decision-making process is not achieved.‖).
144. Joy, supra note 109, 630–31 (―Under Brady . . . the prosecutor has the discretion to
determine what constitutes exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it . . . . The prosecutor makes
these decisions secretly, usually based on personal judgment, and those decisions are not subject to
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the courts, fill in the gaps of the material evidence standard.145 With a
plethora of cases available to choose from, it is easy to see how prosecutors
in different jurisdictions with substantially similar facts can come to vastly
different conclusions about whether evidence is material.146 Even though
factual consistencies across cases exist,147 rather than compiling a cohesive
body of law, prosecutors narrowly focus on the word ―exculpatory,‖
interpret Brady in a variety of ways, and selectively choose cases to define
the lines of the standard for the purpose of their instant case.148
Accordingly, the material evidence standard suffers from a lack of
coherence, consistency, and uniformity in its application.149 The lack of
uniformity and the absence of objective guidelines leave defendants
vulnerable to the effects of cognitive bias on the decisionmaking
process.150
C. Attacking the Source: Adding an Across-Case Component to
Case-Specific Analysis
The inherent problem in the structure of the current standard is its overemphasis on a case-specific analysis.151 Rather than encompassing factual
any established oversight mechanisms.‖).
145. Levenson, supra note 110, at 562 (describing a prosecutor‘s gap-filling function in
deciding what charges to bring). ―[G]aps exist with respect to the prosecutor‘s duty to provide
discovery.‖ Id. ―[T]he role of the prosecutor is to fill the gaps . . . [by] exercising their judgment.‖
Id. A ―clear[ ] example of a prosecutor‘s responsibility to fill in the gaps in the rules is a
prosecutor‘s duty to provide discovery to the defense.‖ Id.
146. Joy, supra note 109, at 630.
147. See infra Part IV.
148. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 94, 103–04 (―With neither a clear definition
of favorable evidence nor a disclosure timetable, prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional
discovery obligation inconsistently . . . . Federal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word
‗exculpatory,‘ have interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways. A number of
prosecutors have interpreted Brady narrowly and believe that a prosecutor‘s Brady obligation is
limited solely to turning over information that someone other than the defendant has confessed to
the crime at issue. Many prosecutors do not focus on the critical language of the Brady decision,
which requires disclosure of evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce one‘s penalty. Others,
knowing of favorable evidence, have tried to predict its effect on the outcome of the case in
deciding whether to disclose. Still others do not view Giglio or impeachment material as part of the
Brady exculpatory disclosure obligation. And yet others have separated the timing of the disclosure
of exculpatory or guilt-related evidence from the disclosure of mitigating or punishment-related
evidence.‖).
149. Id.; Albert D. Brault & Timothy F. Maloney, Editorial, A Standard for Fair Trials, WASH.
POST., May 17, 2009, at A23 (―A 2007 study by the Federal Judicial Center found widespread
inconsistencies in how courts interpret which evidence is favorable to the accused, when it must be
disclosed and how much effort prosecutors must make to find it.‖). See generally FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., supra note 89, at 7–21.
150. See supra Part III.A; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 499; supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
151. Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461,
470 (2009) (arguing that the current standard ―fails to provide explicit guidance on the need to look
at conduct beyond an examination of a specific set of facts‖ and as a consequence, the standard
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concepts that can apply across cases to determine whether the evidence is
material, the current standard leads prosecutors to exclusively compare
facts in the case with other facts from the same case.152 Rachlinski terms
this tendency the ―insider perspective.‖153 A prosecutor who takes an
―insider perspective‖ will over-emphasize case-specific analysis when
examining whether evidence is material.154 As Rachlinski explains, an
―insider perspective‖ is an adoption of an inside view of a problem, where
a person treats the decisionmaking process as a unique experience that she
faces alone.155 An ―outsider perspective,‖ on the other hand, takes an
external, holistic view of a problem.156A person takes an ―outsider
perspective‖ when she treats a decisionmaking problem as one of a class of
similar problems that many others face.157 Applying these paradigms to the
law, a prosecutor with an ―insider perspective‖ places a heavy emphasis on
case-specific analysis,158 whereas a prosecutor with an ―outsider
perspective‖ places an emphasis on a comparative across-case analysis159
when approaching materiality issues.
Obviously, a case-specific analysis is inherently necessary to the
concept of materiality, especially with the materiality standard‘s emphasis
on prejudice.160 It is a necessary requirement because in order to be
material, the evidence must be prejudicial.161 In order to be prejudicial, the
evidence must affect the outcome of the case.162 To determine whether
evidence affects the outcome of the case, the specific facts of a case have
to be examined in relation to one another.163 Even though this type of
analysis is necessary, however, it is not sufficient when performed alone.164
Some commentators have recognized that when a prosecutor overemphasizes case-specific analysis, he is most susceptible to cognitive
suffers from a ―one-dimensional consideration of a single case‖).
152. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66. Id. Other commentators have also recognized this
inherent problem, although each has his or her own term to describe it. Findley & Scott, supra note
122, at 307–08, 349 (labeling the problem as ―tunnel vision‖ to be resolved by implementing
elements from ―outside the tunnel‖); Podgor, supra note 151, at 470 (referring to the problem as a
―one-dimensional consideration of a single case‖ and extolling the need for additional rule-based
safeguards against bias); Taslitz, supra note 139, at 325 (identifying the problem as ―internal
deliberation‖ to be cured by ―external deliberations‖).
153. Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66.
154. See id. at 100.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. A case-specific analysis examines evidence by looking at facts within the case and
comparing them to other facts in the same case.
159. An across-case analysis examines evidence by comparing the immediate case facts to the
facts in other cases.
160. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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bias.165 Ultimately, an exclusive in-case comparison roots the prosecutor‘s
discretion solely in relativity.166 This type of exclusive case-specific
analysis, therefore, eliminates the potential to identify factual concepts,
situations, or patterns across cases that can bring objective guidelines to the
standard.167 Consequentially, an absence of objective guidelines increases
the possibility that cognitive bias will creep into the decisionmaking
process.168 To ameliorate cognitive bias, therefore, the standard must also
include an across-case comparison that can base discretion within objective
guidelines.
Accordingly, an effective definition of material requires a two-step
inquiry. First, the in-case inquiry must ask how the evidence relates to the
other facts in the case. Second, an across-case inquiry must ask how the
evidence relates to factual concepts and situations of other disclosure
cases. This type of workable and effective concept of materiality provides
clear guidance by grounding prosecutorial discretion in the objective
markers of other cases and, subsequently, limits the effects of cognitive
bias.
By introducing objective guidelines from across-case similarities, we
are able to provide guidance to prosecutors. No longer would a prosecutor
be left to his own discretion and focus exclusively on how in-case facts
relate. Rather, he has objective markers on which to compare the facts of
his case to the facts of other cases. Consequentially, the chance that the
prosecutor can be unknowingly influenced by cognitive bias is reduced.
Objective markers will help draw prosecutors‘ attention to material
tendencies, and accordingly, will help counteract the cognitive bias that
takes place when comparing, examining, and synthesizing in-case facts.
Currently, the present standard‘s prejudice requirement incorporates the
case-specific analysis.169 The across-case comparison, however, is not
included in the present standard.170 A codified Strickler three-prong
standard that enumerates precedential-based, bright-line rules would
effectively incorporate an across-case comparison. Therefore, by
identifying and enumerating specific scenarios from the case law that are
highly suggestive of materiality, we can accomplish this two-part inquiry to
determine whether evidence is material.171 We can create a set of
enumerated objective rules that provides guidance to prosecutorial
discretion by extracting the common principles across material evidence
cases.172

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra note 152.
See supra note 152.
Id.
Id.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
See id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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IV. A NEEDED SOLUTION: PROVIDING CLEAR LINES FOR
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Bright-Line Rules Bring Guidance to the Standard
Given cognitive bias concerns, Congress should institute bright-line
rules for prosecutorial disclosure in future cases that mirror factual
scenarios where the Supreme Court has already found similar evidence
material.173 A comprehensive review of the case law provides the types of
situations that should trigger disclosure:
(1)
Promises of immunity or favorable government treatment of
witnesses;174
(2)
Prior inconsistent statements of government witnesses
regarding defendant‘s criminal conduct;175
(3)
―Prior perjury or false testimony of government witness‖;176
(4)
Monetary rewards or inducements of key government
witnesses;177
(5)
―Confessions to the crime in question by others‖;178
(6)
Information reflecting bias or prejudice by government witness
against defendant;
(7)
―Witness statements that others committed crime in
question‖;179
173. There is recognition among commentators that the current standard is susceptible to
cognitive bias because of an over-reliance on case-specific analysis and that inserting objective
external elements would help ameliorate bias. See supra Part III.C.
174. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (finding that the prosecution‘s failure to
disclose immunity promised to the government‘s crucial witness, which was relevant to his
credibility, was a violation of due process and justified a new trial); Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers,
supra note 20, at 103 & n.57.
175. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103 & nn.58–59.
176. Id. at 103; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–43 (1995) (finding a Brady violation
when prosecution suppressed original statements given to police from its ―two best witnesses,‖
which differed drastically from the witnesses‘ testimony on the stand explaining the sequence of
events, description of the killer, and the type of car with ―detailed clarity‖); United States v. Arnold,
117 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110–11 (11th Cir.
1995); DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991) (vacating defendant‘s
conviction where the prosecutor failed to correct the government‘s essential witness‘s perjured
testimony that he would receive nothing in exchange for his testimony); United States v. Stevens,
593 F. Supp. 2d 177, 178, 182 (D.D.C. 2009) (chronicling a pattern of government failure to turn
over exculpatory evidence).
177. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 674–78 (2004) (finding that the prosecution suppressed
evidence about key witnesses status as a paid informant, which would have severely undermined his
credibility); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683–84 (1985) (reversing and remanding
because the prosecution failed to disclose that the key witnesses were paid for their testimony); Am.
Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103.
178. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 86 (1963) (finding that the prosecution‘s suppression of a confession by defendant‘s accomplice
to the actual act of killing was a violation of due process).
179. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103; see also United States v. Robinson, 39
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―Information about mental or physical impairments of
government witnesses‖;180
―Inconsistent or contradictory examinations of scientific
tests‖;181 and
Failure of witness to make positive identification of the
defendant.182

These enumerated scenarios serve as the objective markers of the
―outsider perspective.‖ Enumerating these salient facts forces prosecutors
to compare facts across cases. An across-case comparison counteracts the
cognitive bias in the decisionmaking process. Accordingly, these
enumerated scenarios bring the type of ―outsider perspective‖183 that
provides guidance to prosecutorial discretion.
If prosecutors are going to continue to play a crucial role in our criminal
justice system, we need to recognize the structural weaknesses that prevent
them from doing justice.184 No matter how objectively one may try to
analyze a situation, a mind is inherently biased in its analysis.185 Therefore,
we can better achieve justice by introducing objective guidelines and selfcorrecting restraints into an inherently biased cognitive process.186 By
using these enumerated scenarios as bright-line rules that require
disclosure, the new standard would introduce the type of objectivity that
would help mitigate the influence of cognitive biases on prosecutors‘
disclosure decisions.187
B. A Codification Solution
The Advisory Committee should recommend that Congress codify these
enumerated scenarios into Rule 16 of the Federal Criminal Rules. Even if
the enumerated scenarios are codified, however, it will be up to the
Advisory Committee to determine what type of impact the enumerated
F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the order for a new trial when defendant was
convicted of distributing cocaine but the government failed to disclose testimony from a
codefendant that another former codefendant was the drug courier responsible for the crime).
180. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103 & n.60.
181. Id. at 103 & n.61.
182. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995) (―[T]he effective impeachment of one
eyewitness can call for a new trial . . . .‖); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (finding
that reliability depends in part on the accuracy of prior description); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199–200 (1972) (finding that reliability of identification following impermissibly suggestive lineup
depends in part on accuracy of witness‘s prior description); Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note
20, at 103; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444 (finding the identification by the prosecution‘s ―two best
witnesses‖ would have been severely undermined by use of the witnesses‘ suppressed statements).
183. See Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66.
184. Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395–96 (2009) (arguing that external deliberation is needed to check
internal deliberation).
185. Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 509.
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across-case facts should have on the prosecutor‘s duty. The Committee
could choose to treat them either: (1) as bright-line rules, which would
require mandatory disclosure; (2) as prompting an in-camera discussion of
materiality;188 or (3) as favorable evidence, warranting disclosure if the the
evidence is prejudicial.189
1. Bright-Line Rule Approach
This Note advocates for a bright-line rule approach. Under a bright-line
rule approach, the presence of an enumerated scenario would qualify as a
de facto finding of material evidence, necessitating disclosure.
The Committee should adopt the enumerated scenarios as bright-line
rules, not because all enumerated scenarios in every situation will be
material, but because something more than a pronouncement of the
standard is necessary to limit the effects of cognitive bias on the criminal
justice system.190 In numerous other criminal procedure situations, there
are clear preferences for objective rules instead of subjective standards.191
For example, the Court has carved out per se rules rendering searches of
automobiles reasonable, not because exigent circumstances would justify
the government‘s conduct in every such case, but because of the belief that
there will be exigent circumstances in enough of the cases to justify the
rule.192 This should also be the case with prosecutorial disclosure.193 The
justification for mandatory disclosure rules in federal criminal cases is that
the mere presence of an enumerated scenario—whether actually material or
not—has a substantial probability of affecting the outcome of a case, a
probability that should not be left to the prosecutor alone to weigh.
Accordingly, a bright-line rule approach would effectively confine
prosecutorial discretion within substantive, clear lines. Having these
188. This Note will not discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of an in camera
solution. For a discussion of an in-camera approach, see Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory
Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984). In addition to an in-camera solution, other commentators have
recommended countering cognitive bias through open-file discovery. For an approach that proposes
a prophylactic rule requiring prosecution to turn over all evidence, see generally Burke, supra note
22. For further discussion of open-file discovery and its implementation in the State Criminal Rules
of North Carolina, see Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 257 (2008).
189. For an example of how enumerated scenarios can be used more clearly to define the
favorable evidence prong of the material evidence standard, see Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra
note 20, at 101–04.
190. See Burke, supra note 22, at 508; Bennet L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v.
Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 688 (2006) (―[I]t is readily apparent that Brady violations are
among the most pervasive and recurring types of prosecutorial violations.‖); Janet C. Hoeffel,
Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1133, 1148 (2005) (―Withholding favorable evidence . . . seems to be the norm.‖).
191. Burke, supra note 22, at 508.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 509.
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objective markers will counter inevitable bias in the human
decisionmaking process. Not only would a bright-line rule bring needed
clarity to disclosure, but it would also promote administrative efficiency
and ensure a more consistent application of the current standard.
Furthermore, while it may not deter all appellate litigation, it would
undeniably reduce the number of appeals falling under these enumerated
scenarios. Accordingly, requiring mandatory disclosure of an enumerated
scenario will help eliminate prosecutors‘ disparate interpretations of the
material evidence standard, it will provide prosecutors clear guidance of
when evidence is ―material,‖ and ultimately, it will promote equal
treatment of similarly situated defendants under the law.194
2. Heightened Favorable Evidence Approach
Alternatively, if the Committee decides not to adopt a bight-line rule
approach, the Committee should adopt a heightened favorable evidence
approach. Under a heightened favorable evidence approach, the presence
of an enumerated scenario would qualify as a de facto finding of favorable
evidence, requiring disclosure if prejudice exists.
Arguably, this approach provides more guidance than the current
standard because it brings prosecutors‘ attention to specifically enumerated
scenarios. At the same time, the enumerated scenarios fit hand and glove
with the Court‘s understanding of favorable evidence as most recently
articulated in Strickler.195 Although material evidence and favorable
evidence often have been used interchangeably, Strickler clearly
distinguished the two.196 In Strickler, the Court asserted that three
components made up Brady‘s material evidence standard.197 The first of
these components was favorable evidence.198 Rather than another term for
material evidence, favorable evidence is a distinct type of evidence.199
When combined with prejudice and suppression, favorable evidence
becomes material evidence.200
In essence, the Court in Strickler explained that favorable evidence
tends to suggest materiality, but unlike material evidence, favorable
evidence falls just short of indicating prejudice on its own.201 With such an
194. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 115 (explaining that enumerated factors will
provide the type of guidance to a prosecutor‘s disclosure decisions that ―will help eliminate
disparate interpretations of the Brady obligation by both prosecutors and defense counsel and give
prosecutors clear guidance, thereby promoting equal treatment of similarly situated defendants
under the law‖).
195. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
196. Id.
197. Id. The Supreme Court held that evidence is ―material‖ if it is: (1) favorable to the
accused; (2) willfully or inadvertently suppressed; and (3) prejudicial. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. From the Court‘s definition of material, favorable evidence is something much stronger
than relevant evidence. The Court did not define the first prong of material evidence as simply any
evidence. Its deliberate choice not to do so indicates that favorable evidence must be more than any
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understanding in mind, the material standard would be clarified by listing
the enumerated scenarios as instances of favorable evidence.202 Just as
favorable evidence tends to suggest materiality, the occurrence of an
enumerated scenario also tends to suggest materiality.203 Essentially, the
presence of an enumerated scenario, though not material in itself, places
the prosecutor on notice of likely material evidence. Therefore, listing
numerous instances of favorable evidence in a codified rule would
specifically alert a prosecutor to the most generic instances that normally
require disclosure and would give a prosecutor a heightened awareness for
when material evidence may be present. This heightened awareness would
help prevent cognitive bias from creeping into a prosecutor‘s
decisionmaking process by grounding a prosecutor‘s discretion in
these enumerated across-case facts.204 Although treatment of the
enumerated scenarios as a heightened awareness of favorable evidence
would not limit discretion as much as a bright-line rule, it still helps
ameliorate the cognitive bias problem.205 Moreover, by using the
enumerated scenarios as heightened favorable evidence, Brady‘s and
Strickler‘s distinction between material evidence and favorable evidence is
preserved.206
Whether a bright-line rule or a favorable evidence approach is taken
with regard to the enumerated scenarios, both make materiality a two-part
inquiry and bring an ―outsider perspective‖ to prosecutorial discretion.207
In addition to case-specific analysis, both approaches force an across-case
fact comparison, which helps ground prosecutorial discretion in objective
markers.208 In turn, these objective guidelines help counteract the present
standard‘s inherent cognitive bias.209 By limiting the cognitive bias that
leads to unintentional under-disclosure, a codification of the enumerated
scenarios will help criminal prosecutors better understand their disclosure
responsibilities, will instill far greater confidence that the rules are being
relevant piece of evidence. However, favorable evidence falls short of material evidence and is
distinct from material evidence because it lacks an element of prejudice. Favorable evidence fails to
indicate prejudice on its own. Accordingly, to the Court, favorable evidence is heightened evidence
that tends to suggest materiality and is highly likely to be material, but on its own, is not material.
Id.
202. See supra note 189.
203. See supra note 201.
204. See supra Part III.C.
205. See supra Part III.C.
206. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
207. See Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66.
208. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 101 (―Because the prosecutor alone can
know and weigh what is undisclosed, he is faced with serious and potentially conflicting
responsibilities: to decide whether information is exculpatory, and, if so, whether and when it
should be disclosed to the accused. [Therefore, a] rule of criminal procedure would provide
welcome guidance in carrying out these responsibilities, and would thereby help to ensure fair trials
and sentencing.‖); see also supra Part III.C.
209. See supra Part III.C.
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consistently applied, and ultimately, will help ensure that wrongful
convictions do not occur.210
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over a proposed amendment to Rule 16 resumed on October
14, 2009 and recently culminated on April 16, 2010 as the Criminal Rules
Advisory Committee, again, declined to take any action to adopt a codified
rule.211 There can be no doubt, however, that the debate is not going away
any time soon. Quite the opposite. The Advisory Committee has wrestled
with the issue since the Supreme Court first articulated the material
evidence standard in Brady over forty-five years ago and it will continue to
contentiously debate the issue as long as prosecutorial non-disclosure
pervades the criminal justice system.
It will not be long before the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee
reconsiders the issue again. The next time around, however, the Advisory
Committee will be faced with three new issues. First, the Advisory
Committee will want to discover what impact the USAM amendments had
on prosecutorial disclosure. Second, the Advisory Committee will have to
evaluate the success of the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ in addressing
prosecutorial error.212 And finally, the Committee will want to consider
whether an empirical study of all ninety-four federal jurisdictions should be
conducted.213
Indeed, the hope of the USAM addressing and providing a solution to
prosecutor disclosure abuses was a compelling reason why the Advisory
Committee put off an amendment proposal in 2006214 and indefinitely
suspended their consideration in 2007.215 Although the Advisory
Committee hoped to discover the USAM‘s effect by 2010, the
Committee‘s discussions with the Federal Judicial Center revealed that
measuring the efficacy of the USAM‘s changes does not easily lend itself
to research using the Federal Judicial Center.216 Since those discussions,
however, new ideas for how to study the effect of the USAM‘s changes
have surfaced.217 Indeed, four years have passed since the DOJ‘s 2007
210. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 101.
211. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale, Professor, to Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. (Sept.
20, 2009), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. RULES, MEETING IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER
13–14, at 198 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agen
da%20Books/Criminal/CR2009-10.pdf; see supra Part II.C.1.
212. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 102–03.
214. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes
44–45 (Apr. 3–4, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf.
215. History of Rule 16 Amendments, supra note 72, at 1;ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL
RULES, supra note 98, at 12.
216. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7 (Apr. 15–16,
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04min.pdf.
217. Professor Sara Sun Beale of Duke University has proposed that there is a way to measure
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changes to the USAM, and the Advisory Committee will be quite
interested in exploring these new methods to study the USAM‘s effect.218
However, even if such a study could be undertaken, the results may not
have a significant impact. Given the internal nature of the USAM and its
lack of judicial enforceability,219 it is highly likely that the Advisory
Committee may still conclude that USAM internal ―policy‖ should not
supersede the adoption of a codified and independently enforced
amendment to the Rule.
In addition to studying the impact of the USAM changes, the Advisory
Committee will also want to evaluate the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖
to the issue of disclosure. Indeed, it appears that one of the primary reasons
the Advisory Committee deferred action on an amendment in April 2010
was to consider whether the ―ongoing efforts at the Department of
Justice . . . [could] better address the discovery obligations of
prosecutors.‖220 While the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ represents the
most dramatic step taken by the government to date, the DOJ‘s failure over
the last eight years to provide an effective internal solution provides little
hope that another internal DOJ policy will eliminate non-disclosure
inconsistencies or prosecutorial bias from occurring in the future.
Accordingly, it is likely that the Advisory Committee may conclude that
inter-departmental requirements, self-policing of violations, and federal
prosecutors‘ ―sincere desire to ‗do the right thing‘‖221 are not sufficient to
deter this intrinsic problem.
Furthermore, one final element that will be important in the equation of
a future amendment is whether the Advisory Committee believes an
empirical study on the disclosure issue is even possible.222 While the
the efficacy of the USAM‘s affect on prosecutorial disclosure. Such a study would ―emulate a
model used by hospitals to improve the delivery of health care, whereby the hospital reviews the
treatment of patients in cases selected at random.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm on Criminal
Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf. Beale suggested the Department of Justice could
have conducted this review in U.S. Attorneys‘ offices ―to see if any undetected discovery problems
had occurred.‖ Id. at 6–7.
218. See supra Part II.C.1.
219. See Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 32 (June
11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%
20Part%201.pdf (―[T]he committee would have no way to monitor the practical operation of the
changes or even to know about problems that might arise in individual cases. [Furthermore,] the
[USAM] is a purely internal document of the Department of Justice and not judicially
enforceable.‖).
220. See Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Apr. 15–16,
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04min.pdf.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1–4. When the Standing Committee indefinitely suspended its consideration of a
Brady amendment in 2007, it suggested that the Advisory Committee consider whether the
continued study of the Rule 16 amendment proposal would be beneficial. Id. Primarily, it wanted
the Advisory Committee to determine whether a comprehensive study of the current local rules was
possible or beneficial. Id.
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Federal Judicial Center has undertaken three previous studies, each were
time pressured and underfunded.223 Its report in 2007 was rather limited as
acknowledged in the report itself.224 Also, the Committee itself recognized
that the 2010 survey would also be limited.225 Accordingly, in April of
2010, the members of the Advisory Committee generally agreed that a
more comprehensive survey that examined all ninety-four federal
jurisdictions would be required to more effectively study the issue.226
When this issue comes before the Advisory Committee again, the Advisory
Committee will need to determine whether it believes that such a
comprehensive study could be undertaken.227 If the Advisory Committee
believes that such an exhaustive study is possible and necessary, the
proposed amendment may be years off, and its fate will rely extensively on
that study. On the other hand, however, it may be more likely that the
Advisory Committee concludes such a time-consuming, costly, and
extensive review should not be undertaken.228 No matter how under
resourced or time pressured previous studies by the Federal Judicial Center
have been, the one fact the 2004, 2007, and 2010 studies concluded is that
prosecutorial suppression of material evidence is difficult to study
empirically.229 Many instances of suppression are never uncovered, and
therefore, it is difficult to know the true impact of suppression.230
Although it remains to be seen what the Advisory Committee will
conclude on these three issues, it is clear that circumstances have
significantly changed over the last four years. First, United States v.
Stevens brings a high-profile, emotionally sympathetic example to the
present debate.231 Not only is the case of Sentator Stevens, a well-known
political figure, an example of the consequences at stake, but his mere
involvement might hit close to home for decisionmakers. Indeed, his
223. LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TREATMENT OF
BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND
POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2004); see infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
224. HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 89, at 9.
225. When Judge Richard Tallman, the committee chairman, made his closing remarks on the
issue to the Advisory Committee in October of 2009, he explained that due to the time required to
perform the research of an empirical study, the Advisory Committee was unlikely to see a draft
amendment for consideration at the next meeting in May 2010.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm on
Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 8 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf.
226. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7–8 (Apr. 15–16,
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04min.pdf.
227. HOOPER, MARSH & YEH, supra note 227, at 2.
228. Id. at 12–14.
229. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 89, at 7–8; HOOPER, MARSH & YEH, supra note 224, at
4–5; supra note 227 and accompanying text.
230. See Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 37 (June
11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20
16%20Part%201.pdf.
231. See Johnson & Wilber, supra note 4.
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former colleagues will ultimately be the ones responsible for passing the
Rule. Undoubtedly, his political prominence in relation to the issue will be
influential. Secondly, his case seems to have brought an energized surge to
amend led by prominent members of the federal judiciary.232 Other
circumstances will likely play a major role as well, for example, the impact
of the new DOJ ―multi-faceted approach,‖233 the increasing amount of
commentators studying the issue,234 and the case studies provided by states
with full disclosure discovery laws.235 States that require disclosure of all
evidence will certainly provide another angle from which to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the current system and its alternatives.236
Ultimately, one of the most significant changes this time around is that the
current movement for an amendment seems to be refocusing the issue on
unintentional cognitive bias rather than intentional abuse.237
To address the inherent structural flaws in the current rule and
counteract the unintentional effects of cognitive bias, an amendment to
Rule 16 needs to be adopted.238 As this Note demonstrates, the absence of
objective guidelines in the present discretionary standard permit a
prosecutor to exclusively engage in the very type of case-specific analysis
that is highly susceptible to cognitive bias.239 Because of these cognitive
biases, when prosecutors err in applying the standard, they tend to
underestimate, not overestimate, materiality.240 Accordingly, the present
standard may cause even well-intentioned prosecutors to under-disclose
material evidence.241 This fact alone is the most compelling reason for a
Brady amendment to date.242 Unlike other causes of prosecutorial nondisclosure,243 cognitive bias arguably poses the most serious threat to the
criminal justice system because it not only affects every single prosecutor,
but more importantly, human awareness alone cannot eliminate its
232. See Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan to Richard C. Tallman, supra note 94.
233. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale, supra note 211, at 198–99.
234. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33 (―More recently, other commentators have argued that
faulty judgment is more likely due to various unintentional cognitive biases that prosecutors have
rather than assessing blame against the prosecutors.‖).
235. For a full discussion and analysis of North Carolina‘s open-discovery laws, see generally
Mosteller, supra note 189.
236. Id.
237. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33.
238. See supra Part III.B–C.
239. See supra Part III.C.
240. See supra Part III.A; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96.
241. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96.
242. See id.
243. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33 (reviewing the criticism, Professor Peter Joy believes that
previous assertions of prosecutorial misconduct are attributable to one ―of three institutional
conditions: ‗vague ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary
authority with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct,
which create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, prosecutorial
misconduct‘‖ (quoting Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400)).
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presence.244 Rather, fundamental structural changes are required.245
Ultimately, across-case comparisons enumerated as objective rules in a
codified standard will bring clarity to prosecutorial discretion.246 These
bright line rules will bring an ―outsider perspective‖ to the analysis and
will ameliorate the role that cognitive bias plays in the decisionmaking
process.247 Accordingly, such a solution would help ensure that ―justice
shall be done.‖248

244. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 371 (―The challenge is difficult because the cognitive
biases that contribute to the problem are not easily suppressed by self-awareness, training, or
practice. Unfortunately, research suggests that merely informing people about a cognitive bias, or
urging a person to overcome the bias, is to some degree ineffective.‖).
245. See supra Parts III & IV; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 499 (―Simply to ensure that
defendants receive the material exculpatory evidence to which the Court believes they are entitled,
the legal standards governing prosecutorial disclosure must be changed.‖).
246. See supra Part IV; see also Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 78 (―The logical adaptation to
the influence of [cognitive] bias is a bright-line rule. A list of easily identifiable investments that are
either per se legal or per se illegal would avoid the influence of the [cognitive] bias.‖); Joy, supra
note 109, at 640–42 (concluding that a rule-like approach will provide certainty about the scope of
the standard).
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) (―For though the attorney for the
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his
client‘s [the government‘s] overriding interest that ‗justice shall be done.‘ He is the ‗servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.‘‖ (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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